Success against ISIS requires more than effective military operations. Political accord in Baghdad and the emergence of meaningful inclusive politics in Syria are necessary but not sufficient conditions for securing U.S. vital national security interests in the region. The U.S. must use the expanding leverage increased military support will give us in Baghdad to continue to shape the emerging Iraqi government to be as inclusive and non-sectarian as possible. The U.S. and its allies must meanwhile engage directly and energetically with Sunni leaders in Iraq outside of Baghdad to determine who represents (or might represent) Sunnis willing to re-engage with the government in Baghdad.RTWT.
The U.S. must also engage much more vigorously in efforts to develop an inclusive government-in-waiting in Syria. We must do more than trying to unify what is left of the moderate opposition. We must also reach out to the ‘Alawite community and to Syria’s other minority groups in search of potential leaders who could join forces with moderate Sunni leaders to oppose extremists on all sides.
The deployment of U.S. forces into Syria and Iraq is as important to these political efforts as it is to our military efforts. We must not fall again into the trap of relying on leaders in Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, or Turkey to inform us of the situation on the ground, still less to rally their people from afar. Populations under attack respect most the leaders who stay with them and fight. Those are the leaders we must seek out for the benefit of the political settlement as much as for their military capabilities.
This phase of the strategy will require a significant commitment of U.S. forces — perhaps as many as 25,000 ground troops in all in Iraq and Syria — although in roles very different from those they played in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. The decisive effort will belong to teams of Special Forces and special mission units deployed in a dispersed footprint throughout the Sunni lands, as well as advising the Iraqi Security Forces and the moderate Syrian opposition. Those forces will likely number in the low thousands.
The dispersed footprint from which they will have to operate requires the support of at least a U.S. Army Combat Aviation Brigade (about 3,300 soldiers) to operate transport, reconnaissance, and attack helicopters. These special operators will be at high risk of locally-overwhelming enemy force, as well as attacks by ISIS operatives infiltrating the tribes and even the security forces among whom they will be living. They must have access to a large and responsive quick reaction force (QRF) that can get to threatened units rapidly and with dominating force. We estimate that two battalion-sized QRFs will need to be available at
all times, one in Iraq and one in Syria. Sustaining the availability of two battalions requires the deployment of two brigades, perhaps 7,000 soldiers in all. Additional forces will be required to secure temporary bases, provide MEDEVAC coverage, and support necessary enablers. Flight times and the MEDEVAC requirements to get wounded soldiers to help within the “golden hour” dictate that the U.S. will have to establish temporary bases inside Iraq and Syria. Bases in Kurdistan, Turkey, and Jordan are simply too far away from the core ISIS safe-havens along the Euphrates.
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Thursday, September 18, 2014
A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State
The U.S. needs to deploy at least 25,000 ground troops to effectively contain --- much less defeat --- the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, according to the new study from Kimberly Kagan, Frederick Kagan, and Jessica Lewis at the Institute for the Study of War:
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