Conservative Amnesia

Center-right parties in Europe have forgotten how to be conservative, argues Jan-Werner Mueller, at Foreign Policy, "Europe Forgot What ‘Conservative’ Means":

Whether or not to adapt to right-wing populism constitutes the major strategic dilemma for Europe’s center-right today, writes Jan-Werner Mueller. https://t.co/2hYxTYgKKd

— Foreign Policy (@ForeignPolicy) March 21, 2018

Conventional wisdom has it that Europe’s social democrats are in terminal decline. In recent elections in Italy, Germany, and France, once proud left-wing mass parties have been reduced to at best getting a fifth of the vote. The obvious flip side of the mainstream left’s decline seems to be that populists but also the center-right are faring well. In fact, this picture is highly misleading. Center-right parties — European Christian democrats above all — face a real crisis. It is increasingly unclear what they stand for, and, unlike social democrats, they are in real danger of being replaced by the populist right.

Social democrats have been struggling because the “Third Way” pursued by leaders such as Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder during the late 1990s left them with an enormous credibility problem. They had not just tolerated but actively furthered finance capitalism; deregulation and increasing inequality happened under the watch of nominally left-wing governments, which today are perceived as having betrayed socialist ideals. But, importantly, it is not really in doubt what these ideals are. As the surprise success of Jeremy Corbyn in last year’s British general elections demonstrated, the left can still do remarkably well, under two conditions: Social democrats have to restore their credibility and reorient public attention away from the one issue that is most likely to split its core constituency — immigration. Whether one likes Corbyn’s ideas or not, it is remarkable that a grassroots movement, Momentum, largely captured the Labour Party and effectively erased its toxic association with the widely discredited Blairism.

In somewhat similar fashion, Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been trying to assert an agenda offering better protection for workers and more accessible health care. While this month’s decision to re-enter a grand coalition with the Christian Democrats has temporarily obscured this reorientation, the SPD will likely continue to sharpen its profile as a distinctively left-wing party in government.

If one asks, by contrast, what exactly Europe’s center-right stands for today, most citizens will be unable to articulate an answer. This has partly to do with historical amnesia — including forgetfulness on the part of center-right leaders themselves. After World War II, Christian democrats dominated politics in Germany, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, France. The circumstances were uniquely favorable for such moderate center-right parties, which claimed a religious, though nonsectarian, inspiration. Fascism had discredited the nationalist right; the horrors of the midcentury made many Europeans look for moral certainty in religion; and in the context of the Cold War, Christian democrats presented themselves as quintessentially anti-communist actors. Not least, they suggested that there was an affinity between the materialism of classical liberalism on the one hand and communism on the other — and that they were the only parties that clearly rejected both in favor of communitarian values. It is virtually forgotten today that Christian democratic parties had strong progressive elements — even if one occasionally gets a glimpse of that past: Matteo Renzi, who resigned as leader of Italy’s major left-wing party this month, had actually started his political life as a Christian Democrat.

Above all, Christian democrats were the original architects of European integration. They deeply distrusted the nation-state; the fact that, in the 19th century, both the newly unified Italy and the Germany united by Otto von Bismarck had waged prolonged culture wars against Catholics was seared in their collective memory. European integration also chimed with a distinct Christian democratic approach to politics in general: the imperative to mediate among distinct identities and interests. Ultimately, this quest for compromise among different groups (and, in Europe, states) went back to Pope Leo XIII’s idea — directed against rising socialist parties — that capital and labor could work together for the benefit of all in a harmonious society. Christian democracy had been a creation to avoid both culture war and class conflict.

Little is left of these legacies today. Christian democrats and other center-right parties continue to be pragmatists, but it is often unclear what, other than the imperative to preserve power, animates them in the first place. The European Union’s three main presidents — of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council — are all Christian democrats. Yet none of them has advanced a bold vision for the union as a whole. All seem to take it for granted that citizens are wary of further integration. To be sure, this is the narrative right-wing populists push, but evidence from surveys is far more ambiguous.

Whether or not to adapt to right-wing populism constitutes the major strategic dilemma for Europe’s center-right today...

Actually, Christian Democrats today --- think Angela Merkel --- are basically leftists. Yeah, they better learn how to be conservative again, or be relegated to the dustbin of history. They need to conserve their own societies, for one thing. Sheesh.

But keep reading.

Europe Struggles with the Rise of Populist Nationalism

The tide of national populism doesn't seem to be ebbing.

At WaPo, "Italy election results highlight struggle to govern in Europe as populist forces rise":

Italy election results highlight struggle to govern in Europe as populist forces rise https://t.co/qiBctn6YWS

— Washington Post (@washingtonpost) March 5, 2018

BERLIN — After voters from the snowy peaks of the Alps to the sunny shores of Sicily delivered a verdict so fractured and mysterious it could take months to sort out, the banner headline Monday in the venerable daily La Stampa captured the state of a nation that’s left no one in charge: “Ungovernable Italy.”

The same can increasingly be said for vast stretches of Europe.

Across the continent, a once-durable dichotomy is dissolving. Fueled by anger over immigration, a backlash against the European Union and resentment of an out-of-touch elite, anti-establishment parties are taking votes left, right and center from the traditional power players.

They generally aren’t winning enough support to govern. But they are claiming such a substantial share of the electorate that it has become all but impossible for the establishment to govern on its own. The result is a continent caught in a netherworld between a dying political order and a new one still taking root.

“This has been a post-ideological result, beyond the traditional left-right divide,” said Luigi Di Maio, whose populist Five Star Movement trounced its opponents to become Italy’s largest party on Monday.

Now the country has plunged into uncertainty.

“The traditional structures of political alignment in Europe are breaking down,” said Josef Janning, head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “It started in the smaller countries. But now we see that it’s happening everywhere.”

Even in Germany, the ultimate postwar symbol of staid political stability.

As Italians were voting Sunday, Germans were learning they would finally have a government, a record five months after they went to the polls.

The establishment had hung on. But just barely, and with no evident enthusiasm, either from the voters or from the centrist politicians who will continue to lead the country even as the public increasingly gravitates to the margins.

A similar phenomenon can be seen in countries from east to west, north to south. It took the Dutch 208 days to form an ideologically messy four-way coalition last year after an election in which 13 parties won seats in the parliament.

The Czechs still do not have a functioning government after voting in October yielded an unwieldy parliament populated by anti-immigrant hard-liners, pro-market liberals, communists, and loose alliance of libertarians, anarchists and coders known as the Pirates.

The fragmentation of European politics takes what had been seen as one of the continent’s great strengths and turns it on its head. Unlike the United States and Britain, where winners take all, continental Europe primarily use proportional systems in which the full spectrum of popular opinion is represented in office.

That worked fairly well when the major parties captured some 80 or 90 percent of the vote, as they did in countries across Europe for decades after World War II.

But lately, the major parties have been downsized.

In Germany, the so-called “grand coalition” won just 53 percent of the vote — hardly grand. In Italy, neither of the two traditionally dominant centrist parties cracked 20 percent. A grand coalition is not even mathematically possible.

The trend has become self-reinforcing.

And the authors haven't even mentioned Austria yet, which has a "far-right" coalition now in power.

But keep reading.

Guess Co-Founder Paul Marciano Denies Kate Upton Allegations

At Fox News, and elsewhere:

Kate Upton accuses Guess co-founder Paul Marciano of sexual misconduct https://t.co/9FUHwXaGrf

— Fox News (@FoxNews) February 1, 2018

Kate Upton Accuses Guess Founder Paul Marciano of Sexual Harassment. https://t.co/wEVM0PlQDQ pic.twitter.com/6NUW1xS6r3

— THE FASHION LAW (@TheFashionLaw) February 1, 2018

Kate Upton Wants to Tell Full Story of Accusing Guess Jeans' Paul Marciano of Sexual Abuse https://t.co/w7CZ2QF1Vt

— TMZ (@TMZ) February 1, 2018

Jewel Heist in Paris

Amazing.

Armed thieves steal £4m in valuables from luxury Ritz Hotel in dramatic Paris jewel heist https://t.co/8lwh6BmcXP

— The Independent (@Independent) January 11, 2018

When what police call a "movie-worthy heist" takes place in Venice, even the New York Times pays attention. https://t.co/PDgUnj7dzj

— Kenneth Turan (@KennethTuran) January 4, 2018

Ian Davidson, The French Revolution

*BUMPED.*

At Amazon, Ian Davidson, The French Revolution: From Enlightenment to Tyranny.

Simon Schama, Citizens

This book came out when I was an undergraduate at Fresno State.

At Amazon, Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution.

Peter McPhee, Liberty or Death

*BUMPED.*

Following-up from yesterday eariler, "Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution."

Now here's this book, just out on August 8th, from Peter McPhee, at Amazon, Liberty or Death: The French Revolution.

Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution

Following-up from Monday, "Simon Schama, Citizens."

At Amazon, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution: With a New Preface, 20th Anniversary Edition (Studies on the History of Society and Culture, No. 1).

Simon Schama, Citizens

Following-up from last night, "Ruth Scurr, Fatal Purity."

If you're going to read-up on the revolution, Schama's the benchmark standard.

At Amazon, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution.

Ruth Scurr, Fatal Purity

I read William Doyle's, The Oxford History of the French Revolution, last year.

If I wind up on a Jacobin jag, I think I'll pick it up with this Scurr volume below. Maybe next summer. My 2017 summer reading idyll's winding down, heh.

At Amazon, Ruth Scurr: Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution.

Walter Lord, The Miracle of Dunkirk

*BUMPED.*

At Amazon, Walter Lord, The Miracle of Dunkirk: The True Story of Operation Dynamo.

'Despite heavy censorship by the hopelessly ‘progressive’ government in Sweden the world has learned about the rape epidemic that is being enjoyed by their Muslim immigrant population which has earned the Scandinavian basket case the dubious title of rape capital of the world...'

At Cambrian Dissenters, "American Girl Has a Message for Muslims and the Women of Sweden."

Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence

Here's a change of pace for you, some strategic deterrence theory.

From Keir A. Lieber, and Daryl G. Press, at International Security, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence" (also in PDF):

Nuclear deterrence is based on the threat of retaliation. A nuclear arsenal designed for deterrence must, therefore, be able to survive an enemy first strike and still inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. For most of the nuclear age, the survivability of retaliatory forces seemed straightforward; “counterforce” attacks—those aimed at disarming the enemy's nuclear forces—appeared impossible because the superpower arsenals were large and dispersed, and were considered easy to hide and protect. Today, analysts tend to worry more about the dangers of nuclear terrorism or accidents than the survivability of retaliatory arsenals. Nuclear deterrence appears robust.

Changes in technology, however, are eroding the foundation of nuclear deterrence. Rooted in the computer revolution, these advances are making nuclear forces around the world far more vulnerable than before. In fact, one of the principal strategies that countries employ to protect their arsenals from destruction, hardening, has already been largely negated by leaps in the accuracy of nuclear delivery systems. A second pillar of survivability, concealment, is being eroded by the revolution in remote sensing. The consequences of pinpoint accuracy and new sensing technologies are numerous, synergistic, and in some cases nonintuitive. Taken together, these developments are making the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack much more challenging.

To be clear, nuclear arsenals around the world are not becoming equally vulnerable to attack. Countries that have considerable resources can buck these trends and keep their forces survivable, albeit with considerable cost and effort. Other countries, however—especially those facing wealthy, technologically advanced adversaries—will find it increasingly difficult to secure their arsenals, as guidance systems, sensors, data processing, communication, artificial intelligence, and a host of other products of the computer revolution continue to improve.

The growing vulnerability of nuclear forces sheds light on an enduring theoretical puzzle of the nuclear age. According to one of the leading theories of geopolitics in the nuclear era, the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” nuclear weapons are the ultimate instruments of deterrence, protecting those who possess them from invasion or other major attacks. Yet, if the theory is correct—that is, if nuclear weapons solve countries' most fundamental security problems—why do nuclear-armed countries continue to perceive serious threats from abroad and engage in intense security competition? Why have the great powers of the nuclear era behaved in many ways like their predecessors from previous centuries: by building alliances, engaging in arms races, competing for relative gains, and seeking to control strategic territory—none of which should matter much if nuclear weapons guarantee one's security? Although proponents of the theory of the nuclear revolution acknowledge this anomalous behavior, they attribute it to misguided leaders, bureaucratic pathologies, or dysfunctional domestic politics, not flaws in the theory itself.

Our analysis offers a simpler explanation for the disjuncture between the theory of the nuclear revolution's predictions and the foreign policy behavior of states: geopolitical rivalry remains logical in the nuclear age because stalemate is reversible. For nuclear weapons to revolutionize international politics—that is, to render countries fundamentally secure—the condition of stalemate must be enduring. Arsenals that are survivable today, however, can become vulnerable in the future. Nuclear-armed states thus have good reason to engage in intense competition, even if their own arsenals are currently secure. Stated differently, nuclear weapons are the best tools of deterrence ever created, but the possibility of acquiring disarming strike capabilities—and the fear that an opponent might do the same—explains why nuclear weapons have not transformed international politics.

The increasing vulnerability of nuclear forces also has several implications for nuclear policy. First, if nuclear forces are becoming easier to attack, then all else being equal, nuclear-armed states need to deploy more capable retaliatory arsenals to counter the growing risks. Whether one believes that a deterrent force must present potential attackers with “near-certain retaliation,” “likely retaliation,” or some other level of risk, improvements in counterforce systems require that retaliatory forces adapt—through better capabilities, increased numbers, or both—to maintain the same level of deterrent threat. Furthermore, the rapid rate of change in counterforce technologies increases uncertainty about adversaries' future capabilities, suggesting that countries will need to retain diverse retaliatory forces as a hedge against adversary breakthroughs.

Second, the increasing vulnerability of nuclear arsenals raises questions about the wisdom of future nuclear arms reductions. For decades, engineers have toiled to improve weapons accuracy and remote sensing capabilities. Meanwhile, arms negotiators have devised agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals, with the consequence of reducing the number of targets an attacker must destroy in a disarming strike. Either endeavor—improving weapons or cutting stockpiles—can be defended as a policy for promoting strategic stability, but taken together they are creating underrecognized vulnerabilities. The danger of nuclear arms cuts is exacerbated by improvements in nonnuclear means of attacking nuclear forces: for example, through precision conventional strike, missile defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and cyber operations.

Third, the emergence of a new era of counterforce raises the question of whether it is wise, for the United States in particular, to continue improving nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities. On the one hand, improved counterforce capabilities could be invaluable in a range of plausible scenarios. Improved offensive capabilities could help the United States deter weak countries from initiating conventional conflicts or from escalating in the midst of war. Enhanced counterforce capabilities could also help protect U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland from nuclear attack if a conventional war did escalate. On the other hand, better counterforce could be a source of danger: not only might improved disarming strike capabilities—in any country's hands— increase the temptation to attack, but also potential victims of disarming strikes will seek to escape their vulnerability, thereby possibly triggering arms racing and incentives to strike preemptively.

Both views may be correct. The net benefit of decisions to enhance counterforce capabilities will therefore depend on the particular case. For countries that perceive a highly malign threat environment, face aggressive nuclear-armed adversaries, or have ambitious foreign policy goals, the benefits of developing advanced counterforce capabilities may outweigh the costs. For those countries that face a benign environment and have more modest goals, however, the secondary costs of enhancing counterforce may be too great. In any case, these contentious issues have not received sufficient attention; analysts and policymakers have largely overlooked the ways that rapidly changing technologies are eroding the foundation of deterrence.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We first discuss the key role that arsenal survivability plays in nuclear deterrence theory. Second, we describe the main strategies that planners employ to ensure arsenal survivability in practice. Next, we explore one of the major technological trends eroding survivability, the great leap in weapons accuracy, and illustrate how improved accuracy creates new possibilities for counterforce strikes. We then focus on the second major trend, dramatic improvements in remote sensing, and how the resulting increase in transparency threatens concealed and mobile nuclear forces. We conclude with a summary of our findings and their implications for international politics and U.S. national security.

Nuclear Survivability in Theory

At its core, nuclear deterrence theory rests on two simple propositions. First, countries will not attack their adversaries if they expect the costs to exceed the benefits. Second, nuclear weapons allow countries, even relatively weak ones, to inflict unprecedented levels of damage on those who attack them. Taken together, these propositions suggest that nuclear weapons are the ultimate instruments of deterrence: no conceivable benefit of attacking a nuclear-armed state could be worth the cost of getting hit with nuclear weapons in retaliation. As long as nuclear arsenals are survivable, that is, able to withstand an enemy's first strike and retaliate, nuclear weapons are a tremendous force for peace.

The theory of the nuclear revolution builds on the logic of deterrence theory and extends its implications. Because nuclear weapons make countries fundamentally secure, countries can escape the most pernicious consequences of anarchy. According to the theory of the nuclear revolution, once countries deploy survivable arsenals they no longer need to fear conquest. As a result, they can stop worrying about the relative balance of power; engaging in arms races; or competing for alliance partners and strategic territory.

Proponents of the theory of the nuclear revolution have always recognized the discrepancy between their theory's predictions and the actual behavior of countries in the nuclear era. The Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular, is filled with empirical anomalies: extensive arms racing, intense concerns about relative power gains and losses, and competition for allies and control of strategic territory—all occurring at a time when the main adversaries appeared to be invulnerable to disarming strikes. World War III was averted, as nuclear deterrence theory would predict, but the transformation of international politics that advocates of the theory of the nuclear revolution anticipated never materialized. Today, nuclear powers still eye each other's economic power and military capabilities warily; strive for superiority over their adversaries in conventional and nuclear armaments; aim to control strategically relevant areas of land, air, sea, and space; seek to build and maintain alliances; and prepare for war.

The discrepancy between the theory of the nuclear revolution and the behavior of states stems from the theory's misplaced confidence in the survivability of nuclear arsenals.18 Proponents of the theory believe that nuclear weapons deployed in even moderate numbers are inherently survivable. Moreover, according to the argument, survivability is a one-way street: once a country deploys a survivable arsenal, it will remain that way. Yet, what if survivability is reversible?

If arsenal survivability depends on the uncertain course of technological change and the efforts of adversaries to develop new technologies, states will feel compelled to arms race to ensure that their deterrent forces remain survivable in the face of adversary advances. They will worry about relative gains, because a rich and powerful adversary will have more resources to invest in technology and military forces. They will value allies, which help contribute resources and valuable territory. Moreover, states may be enticed to develop their own counterforce capabilities in order to disarm their adversaries or limit the damage those adversaries can inflict in case of war. In short, if nuclear stalemate can be broken, one should expect countries to act as they always have when faced with military threats: by trying to exploit new technologies and strategies for destroying adversary capabilities. If arsenals have been more vulnerable than theorists assume, or if survivability and stalemate are reversible, then the central puzzle of the nuclear era—continued geopolitical competition—is no longer a puzzle.

We argue not only that stalemate is reversible in principal, but also that changes in technology occurring today are making all countries' arsenals less survivable than they were in the past. The fear of suffering devastating retaliation will still do much to deter counterforce attacks, but countries will increasingly worry that their adversaries are trying to escape stalemate, and they will feel pressure to do the same. Deterrence will weaken as arsenals become more vulnerable. In extreme circumstances—for example, if an adversary threatens escalation (or begins to escalate) during a conventional war—the temptation to launch a disarming strike may be powerful. In short, in stark contrast to the expectations of the theory of the nuclear revolution, security competition has not only endured, but also will intensify as enhanced counterforce capabilities proliferate...

More.

Why Would President Trump Go to France for 'Bastille Day'? (VIDEO)

Here's Jessie Watters' Jersey Shore "Bastille Day Beach Quiz," for Fox News:

President Trump Was Good-Humored with Reporters on Air Force One for an Hour, in Stark Contrast to How He Treats the News Media in Public

Following-up from Thursday, where I mentioned, "President Trump is killing it in Paris!"

When he gets away from the leftist siege of D.C., he loosens up. Has a good time. And then you find him as a raconteur with the media correspondents. They're not used to it, so it becomes a story.

President Trump is a nice guy. You'd definitively like to have a Big Mac with him, lol.

See the New York Times, at Memeorandum, "Dropping the Bluster, Trump Revives Banter With Reporters":

WASHINGTON — The Donald J. Trump who turned up in the press cabin of Air Force One on Wednesday evening, as his plane crossed the Atlantic Ocean on the way to Paris, was starkly different from the one who publicly pillories the news media but surprisingly familiar to reporters who know him well.

The president had taken off his tie but kept on his jacket — a wardrobe change that for him qualifies as casual Friday — and he was in a happy-hour frame of mind. Expansive, engaging, even at times ebullient, Mr. Trump held forth for an hour, addressing reporters by name and alighting on topics as different as Chinese history and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

It was a loose, good-humored side of Mr. Trump that the public rarely sees amid the fusillade of angry speeches and venomous tweets that have characterized the president’s first six months in the White House. And it came to light only because he retroactively put the session on the record, asking a reporter the next morning why she had not quoted his remarks.

White House aides say they see more of this side in the Oval Office, where the president has debated advisers about issues like sending more troops to Afghanistan. Diplomats say their bosses see more of it in meetings, where Mr. Trump has engaged even those who are deeply skeptical of his views, like Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany.

But this is hardly the view most people have of a president who built his populist appeal on contempt for the mainstream media; who thundered on Inauguration Day, “This American carnage stops right here”; and who told supporters on his 100th day in office, “If the media’s job is to be honest and tell the truth, the media deserves a very, very big fat failing grade.”

In some ways, Mr. Trump has reversed the usual dichotomy between the public and private president.

“One of the great differences between Trump and more successful politicians, like J.F.K. and F.D.R., is that they would vent their spleen in private, but in public, they would project a more humorous and civilized face,” said Robert Dallek, a presidential historian.

John F. Kennedy, he said, canceled the White House’s subscriptions to The New York Herald Tribune out of pique at its coverage, even as he wooed and won over reporters. Mr. Trump has publicly tarred reporters, like Jim Acosta of CNN, while continuing to watch their networks.

The White House’s antagonism toward the news media is born of genuine grievance and a calculated strategy that it plays well with Mr. Trump’s political base. But his hunger for press — which he nourished over 40 years of cultivating reporters, taking their calls on virtually any subject and calling them out of the blue to chat — remains undiminished.

When Mr. Trump came to the back of Air Force One, his deputy press secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, stipulated that the conversation would be off the record. Despite suffering one of the worst weeks of his political career, he was in a buoyant mood. He fended off Ms. Sanders when she interrupted him to suggest he should return to his cabin so the reporters could get some sleep (they assured him they were not tired)...

More.

Also at Althouse, "'Expansive, engaging, even at times ebullient...a loose, good-humored side of Mr. Trump" — described in the NYT today."

And still more at JustOneMinute, "Now Who Wants to Be Liked?"

VIDEO: President Trump Teases Emmanuel Macron on French Security: 'You'd better do a good job...'

President Trump is killing it in Paris!

Watch:



And at Free Beacon, "Trump Teases Macron on Security of France: ‘You’d Better Do a Good Job’."

Is it 'America First'? Or, America in Isolation?

Following-up from this morning, "Emmanuel Macron Pushed Brusquely to the Front of G20 Group Photo, So He Could Stand Next to President Trump (VIDEO)."

This article, below, at the Los Angeles Times, is what I was talking about. 19 nation-states against 1, the United States, most emphatically on the issue of "climate change." It occurred to me last night that all of these other nations are literally leading the world community off a cliff into non-survival and oblivion. There's not enough windmills and solar panels in the world to power the energy needs of the real people of the global community. This, among the most important things, is why Trump's presidency is so brilliant.

See, "Trump's 'America first' approach receives a cold reception at global summit" (safe link):

President Trump's signature slogan — “America first” — has been tweaked recently by administration aides eager to show that his nationalism is not at odds with the United States' traditional global leadership role. Their new version: "America first does not mean America alone."

Yet America was undeniably alone as Trump on Saturday departed the annual summit of the so-called Group of 20 leaders here. With the leaders' final statement, it was evident that Trump's prioritization of American self-interest — on environmental agreements, trade, migration and more — left him, and thus America, often in unfamiliar isolation.

After two days of cordial smiles, handshakes and back-slapping, Trump expressed satisfaction with the summit. Even so, he was alone among leaders of the world’s major economic powers in dissenting from its resolution affirming the Paris climate accord. And while he has threatened to abandon existing trade deals and penalize countries for what he sees as unfair trade practices, particularly on steel exports, the summit’s closing declaration affirmed support for open markets and fighting protectionism.

After the more exclusive Group of 7 summit in May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel had described the meeting as “six against one” — the one being the United States. As she closed the G-20 gathering that she hosted this week, Merkel again singled out the United States.

In a news conference, Merkel said she “deplores” America’s decision to walk away from the Paris climate agreement and, despite Trump’s comments, does not believe the administration is open to renegotiating the terms agreed to among more than 190 nations to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Merkel, as she has before, called on European countries to step into the vacuum that Trump is leaving on the world stage.

"We as Europeans have to take our fate into our own hands," she said.

The new French president, Emmanuel Macron, who will host Trump next week in Paris to mark Bastille Day, echoed his ally Merkel. “The world has never been so divided,” he said.

In another break from past decades, the United States seemed closer to Russia — in goodwill if not on many issues — than with traditional allies such as Germany and France after Trump’s genial tete-a-tete with President Vladimir Putin, which was the presidents’ first meeting since Trump took office.

Trump’s meeting with Putin, lasting more than two hours, was his longest with any leader. He raised Americans’ concerns over Russian election meddling, according to aides, but the two presidents decided to put the matter behind them and move on to discuss how they can address their differences over Syria, Ukraine and North Korea.

Unlike many other leaders, including Putin, Trump didn’t hold a news conference at the conclusion as American presidents typically have. Putin, in his meeting with reporters, denied again — as he did to Trump on Friday — that Russia interfered in the U.S. election, and said he thinks that Trump accepted his face-to-face denials.

Putin also said that Trump asked him many questions about Russia’s alleged meddling, which Trump has called “a hoax” despite the consensus of American intelligence agencies that Russia did try to sway the election to Trump. FBI and congressional investigations also are probing whether Trump associates colluded with Russia.

White House officials declined to challenge Putin’s view that Trump accepted his denials when questioned by reporters aboard Air Force One en route back to Washington.

Trump "will be happy to make statements himself" about his meeting with Putin, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said...

More.

Emmanuel Macron Pushed Brusquely to the Front of G20 Group Photo, So He Could Stand Next to President Trump (VIDEO)

You know, this one story puts the lie to all the leftist media establishment hit pieces claiming how the U.S. was weakened and belittled at the G20 summit (because of President Trump).

Actually, it's a joke. None of those countries at the conference --- not one --- could manage effectively without close economic, military, and diplomatic relations with the U.S.

At the Telegraph U.K, "Emmanuel Macron 'did not breach protocol by pushing to front of G20,' say the French":

Emmanuel Macron was merely following protocol when he elbowed his way to the front of G20 leaders to stand beside Donald Trump for a group photograph, French media claimed on Sunday.

Le Parisien newspaper said: “As shown in a video by the British daily, The Telegraph, the president of the [French] Republic treated himself to a little stroll before taking his place beside his American counterpart.”

Initially placed towards the back of the group for the “family photograph” of leaders attending the Hamburg summit, Mr Macron is shown in the footage pushing to the front.

After surprising Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, as he jostled past him, Mr Macron paused briefly to embrace the Norwegian premier, Erna Soldberg, on both cheeks.

“All this [happened] as Angela Merkel looked on, astonished or even annoyed,” Le Parisien reported.

The newspaper, reputed for its accurate and fair coverage, commented: “Despite condemnation by some media, especially the British, who considered that the French president moved of his own accord to be closer to Donald Trump, in reality the placement follows a strict diplomatic rule.”

You don't "elbow your way" to the front unless you're scared someone else is going to be photographed next to the President of the U.S. and you're not. Good on Macron. His actions show he's not as hare-brained as I'd thought.

Also at American Thinker, "French president Macron pushed his way to stand next to President Trump at G-20 group photo."

Eugen Joseph Weber, The Hollow Years

*BUMPED.*

At Amazon, Eugen Joseph Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s.

Piotr Stefan Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936

At Amazon, Piotr Stefan Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland.

Although France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were in jeopardy from a recovery of German power after World War I and from a potential German hegemony in Europe, France failed in her efforts to maintain a system of alliances with her two imperiled neighbors. Focusing on the period from 1926 to 1936, Piotr Wandycz seeks to explain how and why these three nations, with so much at risk, neglected to act in concert. Wandycz is the author of a well-known study on the series of alliances constructed by France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the years following the Treaty of Versailles. In this current volume he picks up the story after the Locarno Pact (1925) and follows the progressive disintegration of the alliance system until the time of Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland.

Through an examination of the political, military, and economic relations among France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the author provides valuable insights into an era that contained the seeds of the future war and the collapse of the historic European system. By relying on French, Polish, and more selectively Czechoslovak and Western archives, and thanks to his intimate knowledge of Central and East European published sources, he has filled a large gap in the history of prewar diplomacy. He shows how the divergent aims of Czechoslovakia and Poland combined with a decline of French willpower to prevent a real cohesion among the partners.