His article, "Does One Right Make a Realist? Conservatism, Neoconservatism, and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of American Elites," dissects the varied orientations in right-wing foreign policy, and argues that neoconservatives are essentially "nationalist surpremacists" in their ideological stress on both power and morals in global affairs.
Specifically, the significance of Rathbun's research is to differentiate the foreign policy persuasions of those on the right regarding the understanding and implications of "realism," which is the paradigm in international politics holding actor agency as egoistic self-interest defined as power (with little stress on humanitarianism as a goal of U.S. global purpose).
The argument is concise and refreshing in its review of theories of international power poltics. Especially good is the clarification of how neoconservatism stands apart from conservative realism or isolationism as a powerful paradigm of good and moral right for America in the world:
Conservatives are realist in the sense that they define the national interest narrowly and materially, treat international politics as amoral, consider force a necessary but not universally appropriate instrument, recognize that a preponderance of power creates as many problems as it solves, and guard sovereignty so as to facilitate rapid adjustment to international realities while recognizing the possible instrumental use of international organizations. Neoconservatives, in contrast, define more grandiose national interests, justified by a belief in American moral authority, often think of force as the primary instrument for realizing international outcomes, advocate the achievement and maintenance of American preponderance, and oppose the involvement of multilateral institutions on principled grounds as illegitimate bodies inherently threatening to American sovereignty. Nor are the neoconservatives idealistic. Their stress on American values emerges from a deep sense of national pride that in its more exuberant form translates into a feeling of moral superiority in international affairs. Neoconservatives refuse to separate the pursuit of American self-interest and those of the greater international good, arguing that serving America’s cause is the world’s cause. They are not idealists or realists, but nationalists. This conceptualization, while it distinguishes between the different rights, also offers an understanding of what unites them. Realism and nationalism both serve as poles on different identity dimensions that separate ‘‘us’’ from ‘‘them,’’ albeit in different ways. In all cases, the right is more egoistic. There are simply multiple ways of being so. The realist dimension concerns how narrowly foreign policy is defined. Realists are not humanitarians. They envision foreign policy as obliging no more than the pursuit of policies benefiting the self. Positions on this dimension capture the degree of distinction made between self and other. The second dimension also involves notions of self and other, but in terms of their rank, rather than their distinctiveness. The right in this dimension, the nationalist or neoconservative variety, pursues a preeminent position vis-a-vis the rest of the world. With this emphasis on position in an international hierarchy comes a tendency to define self-interest more expansively and ambitiously. And a feeling of being entitled to one’s rank serves as a moral justification for egoism. The final dimension concerns the separation of self from other, with the isolationist right seeking to detach itself from the rest of the world.Here's the heart of Rathbun's argument of neoconservatism's vital ideational power, which he contrasts to the cold "instrumental empathy" of traditional realism:
Neoconservatives find their inspiration in a belief in the greatness of the American nation, which justifies its preeminent rank in the global hierarchy, defined in terms of both military and moral power. Neoconservatism is not a nostalgic patriotism. Irving Kristol, the intellectual father of modern neoconservatism, writes that ‘‘neoconservatism is not merely patriotic—that goes without saying—but also nationalist. Patriotism springs from a love of the nation’s past; nationalism arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive greatness.’’ Nationalism provides the greater purpose needed to mobilize societal virtue and prevent the slide into decadence. Kristol and Kagan argue that such a sense of commitment is necessary even to preserve basic vital interests. This is why the movement so embraced Ronald Reagan. The President vanquished the Vietnam syndrome that had sapped America’s self-confidence and crippled the administration of Jimmy Carter in its dealings with Iran and the Soviet Union. In doing so, Reagan drew a strict moral line that neoconservatives respect between virtuous American democracy and an evil totalitarian empire....A key point for Rathbun is that neoconservative evangelical moral nationalism is not new. It can be traced back at least a hundred years, to the administrations of William McKinley and Theodore Rooseelt (for more on this, see, Robert Kagan, "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, c. 1776").
Neoconservatism is not a nationalism of the soil as is the case with American isolationism or other nationalisms across the globe. Rather, it is based on the superiority of American ideals and values, a universal nationalism. As a result, even more than others, American nationalism has a strong moral component that distinguishes it sharply from the amorality of realism. Realism is simply pragmatic, while neoconservatism puts great stress on the importance of American ideas and the strength it derives from them. Neoconservatives take what might be considered a constructivist approach to world politics that is sharply distinguished from the realists’ austere materialism. Hence, they are highly engaged in the media battle over the course of American foreign policy.45 The belief in the superiority and universality of American national values leads them to a vigorous promotion, at least rhetorically, of American institutions and ideals, most notably democracy. However, they do so in a unilateral way, in keeping with their nationalism....
The consequence of this moral self-confidence is a tendency to perceive the world as a struggle for power between good and evil. This was the sustaining force of the neoconservative nationalists during the Cold War, who saw the ongoing competition with the Soviet Union as more than just a realist struggle for power or survival. It was a moral crusade as well The sense of moral superiority shared by neoconservatives is most clearly seen in their repeated insistence that there is no distinction between the national interest and that of the international community.
This is an important argument, as the purpose of Rathbun's piece is to sort out the forms of "egoism" in conservative foreign policy and offer a roadmap for electoral choice this November.
Crucially, neoconservative nationalism is not to be confused with "neoliberal internationalism," the popular outward-looking foreign policy persuasion of left-wing elites in the U.S. (a crude example is found in Matthew Yglesias', Heads in the Sand, but see also, Peter Beinart, "Balancing Act: The Other Wilsonianism").
In contrast to liberal internationalism, Rathbun announces, neoconservatism "always begins with the national interest."
That differentiation is key, not just for electoral decisionmaking across variations in conservatism, but for electoral choice between left and right as well.
Leftists, and neoliberal internationalist to a lesser degree, recoil at the deployment of force in the context of power and interest.
It's no surprise that in recent weeks leftists have been vehemently dismissive of the use of force in dealing with international crises in Myanmar and Zimbabwe. But as the Ingrid Betancourt rescue has shown, the deployment of force in the final anaysis represents the true victory of power and morality in world affairs (in other words, "The Bush Doctrine Is Relevant Again").
We can see, then, some of the theoretical bases for both leftist and libertarian isolationist opposition to John McCain presidential campaign.
Just this week the New York Times found Theodore Roosevelt to be John McCain's ideological predecessor, in "McCain’s Conservative Model? Roosevelt (Theodore, That Is)," especially with reference to Roosevelt's assertiveness in foreign policy.
Today's antiwar forces, however, would like less assertiveness and dramatically more humility and restraint. And as anyone familiar with today's trends in political polarization know, such desires generally erupt into the most vicious demonizing attacks against neoconservatives and the neoconservative basis for the Bush administration's foreign policy.
