... the end of Qaddafi’s rule is a great accomplishment for the Obama administration and for the president personally. It is a shame that some administration officials are trying to downplay the role of the United States in this whole affair, absurdly trying to turn the “leading from behind” gaffe into a kind of Obama doctrine. In fact, the United States was not “leading from behind.” By far the most important decision taken by any world leader in this entire episode—the decision that made all the difference—was President Obama’s decision that the United States and the world could not stand by and see the people of Ben ghazi massacred.That's a dramatically different take than Max Boot's, "Did Libya Vindicate 'Leading From Behind'?" Boot doesn't love America's reserve role in these interventions, especially since success requires American military power to begin with. Why shrug off our leadership role and argue "we've got your back"? Kagan just calls it an American victory no matter how you slice it. But all along I've found Victor Davis Hanson's arguments to be the most compelling, which hold, for example, that the Obama administration hadn't the slightest clue about toppling Gaddafi, as evidenced by the administration's pathetic flip-flopping on the goal of regime change or not.
That American choice was the turning point. All praise to France’s Nicolas Sarkozy and Britain’s David Cameron for being ahead of the president in seeing the need for armed action—just as Margaret Thatcher was ahead of George H.W. Bush in seeing the need for action against Saddam Hussein in 1990. But here is the plain and critical truth of the matter: None of this could have been done without the United States leading the way.
Only the United States has the military capacity, the weaponry, the surveillance technology, and the skill to open a safe path for the air and ground war against Qaddafi’s forces. France and Britain alone would not and probably could not have done the job without unacceptable risk to their forces, which were very thin to begin with. In the early days, especially, American A-10 and AC-130 ground attack aircraft were critical in pummeling Qaddafi’s armored vehicles and forcing them to halt offensives against rebel positions. In the last days of the conflict, American high-tech surveillance allowed the rebels to pinpoint the positions of Qaddafi forces in and around Tripoli. Throughout months of fighting, prowling American Predator drones forced Qaddafi and his men to keep their heads down.
The president and his secretary of state also carried out an adept diplomacy that eventually garnered not only European but, remarkably, Arab support as well. This in turn forced both Russia and China—fearful of Arab wrath—to acquiesce. There were costs, of course: a U.N. resolution inadequate to the task at hand and the usual problem of trying to keep many players on board during a mission. On balance, however, it was worth it. The administration was surely right that the intervention would be more effective if it did not appear to be exclusively an American operation and that the combination of European and Arab support for removing Qaddafi was enough of a prize to warrant some compromises.
But the larger point is that, again, only the United States could have pulled all these disparate political and regional forces together. No other nation, not France, not Great Britain, not even a united EU (which German opposition prevented) could have managed this global diplomatic task. In this allegedly “post-American” world, the United States remains both indispensable and irreplaceable.
In any case, Kagan and Boot agree on one thing: The war's not over yet.
