Iraq Success to Resonate Through International System

Robert Kaplan, at American Interest, makes the case that success in Iraq will resonate to the benefit of U.S. foreign policy and international security:

The Iraq war has cost hundreds of billions of dollars and the death of close to 4,000 American troops, plus many more seriously wounded. This is not to mention the death of perhaps 100,000 or more Iraqis (estimates vary wildly). Thus, it is hard to imagine any future circumstance that will make the cost of invading Iraq seem worthwhile—and I say this as a supporter of the war years back. Moreover, I am leery of assuming that we may win this war merely because of the demonstrable improvement in conditions on the ground throughout the course of 2007. That is because we will not know how sustainable that improvement really is until we start withdrawing troops in significant numbers. Still, improvements on the ground certainly raise the possibilities of a better rather than a worse outcome.

My definition of a “better” outcome would be a continued, gradual decline in American and Iraqi deaths coupled with a gradual return to normal living conditions. No one could credibly declare victory, and Iraq would continue to drop out of the news. Iraq has already gone from a page-one to a page-two story in the course of the last year; if it drops to page three or four, say, by the end of 2008, that would qualify as a better outcome, if not a “win.”

What might be the repercussions of such a better outcome? Inside Iraq, it would result in a residual number of American troops, say about 80,000, with semi-permanent bases in the country. In other words, in historical and strategic terms, a key result of the war will have been to replace U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia with new ones in Iraq. No Iraqi government will ever admit to this, but that will be the practical result of the continued need for American troops into the future.

These American bases would exist alongside an Iranian sphere of influence in Shi‘a-dominated southern Iraq, a Sunni tribal chieftaincy in the center, and an autonomous Kurdistan in the north. The country would remain formally united, but in the loosest of ways. It would be a weak state where the Iranians, through their high-handed meddling, might wear out their welcome mat faster than we would by our troop presence. Meanwhile, suspicion and corruption would reign as a legacy of the Ba‘athi regime, something that will take decades to assuage. A balance of fear would limit violence to largely criminal elements.

This is, of course, a best-case scenario. The better Iraq does, the better I believe will be our relationship with the Iranians. There is a saying about Iranians: They don’t give in to pressure, only to a lot of pressure. The stabilization of conditions on the ground in Iraq, coupled with the emerging reality of a continued American troop presence, would constitute the centerpiece of that pressure. If the United States and Iran are destined one day to negotiate at high diplomatic levels, that centerpiece will underwrite the U.S. position in those negotiations.

Because everything is interlocked in the Middle East, a better outcome in Iraq will affect many other issues positively, as well. With more leverage on account of Iraq, the United States will be in a stronger position to, in effect, dictate—yes, dictate—terms to Palestinians and Israelis, once they inevitably encounter one impasse after another in their negotiations. More leverage both in Iraq and in the peace talks will, in turn, lead to more leverage for the United States throughout the Sunni Arab world, especially with respect to Saudi Arabia. Expect, therefore, the Saudis to become progressively more helpful in intelligence sharing and many other related matters concerning the war on terror.

The better we do in Iraq, the more helpful the Syrians may prove to be in Lebanon and in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Had we still been bleeding in Iraq late in 2007, as we were before the surge, the Annapolis peace conference might not have convened, and certainly the Syrians would not have participated. In other words, Annapolis presaged the results of a better outcome, and indeed, there is already a well-established pattern of how events in Iraq affect our regional prospects. Consider the years 2003 through the beginning of 2005, in the wake of our invasion and up through the first Iraqi election, which went off so smoothly: Think of what happened in the region during that period of relatively positive news from Iraq. The Libyans gave up their nuclear program, the Iranians, we now (think we) know, suspended their attempts at nuclear weaponization, and in Lebanon came the Cedar Revolution. Now imagine for a moment what could transpire if we recover that positive momentum in Mesopotamia. To wit, expect to see nascent democracy movements pick up steam throughout the Arab world, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt.

Kaplan suggests American leaders approach the international ramifications of Iraq with humility. We should reach out Muslims leaders and put all issues on the table, he argues, and that includes Iran.

I wouldn't go so far. Just this week President Ahmadinejad proclaimed Iran the "world's greatest superpower," obviously a slap at the American preponderance and the U.S.-backed nuclear non-proliferation agenda directed at Tehran.

Still, Kaplan's essay's a penetrating rejoinder to those who argue we need to restore American power and prestige in the world. Nothing succeeds like success, a point both friends and enemies can't miss.

See also my earlier entry from the American Interest Iraq series, "Winning in Iraq? Ask a Neoconservative."