Slow Start to Middle East 'Peace Talks'

At LAT:

Reporting from Washington - Israeli and Palestinian leaders formally reopened peace talks Thursday by setting a work plan for the next year, but adjourned without progress on their conflict over Israeli housing construction in disputed areas, an issue that threatens to quickly undermine the negotiations.

Meeting at the State Department, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to meet again on Sept. 15 and to work out an outline as the first step to reaching a final peace deal by next September. The two leaders, whose last face-to-face session was 20 months ago, plan to hold discussions every two weeks.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, who hosted the four hours of talks, praised the two leaders.

"The decision to sit at this table was not easy," she said. "We've been here before and we know how difficult the road ahead will be."

But diplomats said officials on both sides as well as their American colleagues remain deeply anxious over the settlement construction dispute. A partial Israeli moratorium on new settlements in the occupied West Bank ends on Sept. 26 and Jewish leaders are reluctant to extend it. At the same time, Palestinians have threatened to walk out on the talks if construction resumes.

U.S. officials have urged Israeli and Palestinian leaders to stop publicly declaring their positions, in hopes that it will be easier for each to give ground in coming weeks, according to diplomats who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the talks.

U.S. officials are hoping that if the talks gain momentum in the coming weeks, it will give officials on both sides the political cover to make compromises that, at the moment, only are likely to inflame their constituencies.

As talks continue, it also will become more difficult for the leaders to break off their participation, diplomats noted.

I don't expect any progress frankly, and I don't support the "peace process" while this administration is in power. No doubt Netanyahu is hoping to retain a decent relationship with the U.S., despite the fact of having already been dissed, and dissed badly.

Besides, most Democrats are likely to see the situation from the vantage point of Robert Malley and Peter Harling at Foreign Affairs, "How Obama Can Chart a New Course in the Middle East." Basically, the piece is one long screed blaming all the problems in the region on the Bush administration. Seriously. It's that bad:

The George W. Bush administration's approach to the Middle East and its response to the 9/11 attacks fundamentally altered the region's security architecture. By ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and Iraq of Saddam Hussein, Washington unwittingly eliminated Tehran's two overriding strategic challenges, thus removing key impediments to Tehran's ability to project power and influence across the region. At the same time, after the breakdown in the Israeli-Palestinian talks, the Bush administration redefined the core principles underpinning the peace process. It made meaningful advances dependent on preconditions, such as changes in the Palestinian leadership, the establishment of statelike institutions in the occupied territories, and the waging of a nebulous fight against an ill-defined terrorist menace. The end result was polarization of the region in general and of the Palestinian polity in particular. This approach also heightened the costs of the U.S.-Israeli alliance in the eyes of the Arab public. Finally, the United States overreached when -- not content with having secured Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon -- it pursued the unrealistic three-part goal of isolating Damascus, disarming Hezbollah, and bringing Lebanon into the pro-Western camp.

Although U.S. policy at the time helped put an end to the impasses that had long plagued Iraq and Lebanon, this came at a heavy human and political cost. More broadly, the resumption of crises in the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, and between the Israelis and the Palestinians prompted an ongoing, persistently vicious, and periodically violent renegotiation in the balance of power among nations (involving Egypt, Iran, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey) and within nations (in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories). Suddenly, everything seemed up for grabs.

This proliferation of conflicts and emergence of new threats to U.S. interests occurred just as U.S. power was eroding and regional rivals were gaining strength. Serious limitations to the United States' military capabilities were exposed directly (in the quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq) and indirectly (when Washington's ally, Israel, suffered setbacks in the Lebanon and Gaza wars).

Meanwhile, Washington made the promotion of liberal values a pillar of its Middle East policy, putting forth a profoundly moralistic vision of its role, precisely at a time when it was trampling the very principles underlying that vision. A president whose foreign policy was predicated on an ability to inspire Arabs with the rhetoric of democratic values undercut any such inspiration by occupying Iraq, rejecting the results of the Palestinian elections in January 2006, showing excessive deference to Israeli policies, and permitting human rights violations to take place, most notably at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.

The "with us or against us" philosophy underpinning the U.S. war on terrorism placed Washington's Arab allies in a relationship that was becoming increasingly uncomfortable and politically costly as animosity toward the United States became widespread. Meanwhile, Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah benefited from renewed popular sympathy and were driven together despite their often ambiguous relations and competing interests.

Washington's enemies were finding that the impediments to their geographic expansion and political ascent had disappeared: with the collapse of the Iraqi state, Iran was free to spread its influence beyond its borders toward the Arab world; Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon unshackled Hezbollah, helping transform it into a more autonomous and powerful actor; and the bankruptcy of the peace process boosted Hamas' fortunes and deflated Fatah's.

Right.

No mention of the extreme Jew-hatred roiling all of these states, who were obviously "increasingly uncomfortable" that the GOP regime in Washington circa 2001-2009 wouldn't kowtow to terror.

So, let the Democratic interregnum pass, I say. Start the "peace process" again when the party in power not only respects Israel, but actually knows WTF is going on.