Chronic Misperception and U.S.-Iraq Conflict

A powerful and very interesting study from Charles Duelfer and Stephen Benedict Dyson, at International Security, "Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience."

Some may recall that Duelfer led the Iraq Survey Group investigating Iraq's WMD programs, which issued a report, "Comprehensive Revised Report with Addendums on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction." And check the criticism of Duelfer from Christopher Carson, "What Charles Duelfer Missed."

Opinions are pretty much set in stone on the causes of war with Iraq. That said, the Duelfer and Dyson study at International Security is valuable for its perspective on the dyadic dynamics of U.S.-Iraq conflict. Theories of misperception delve into the psychological biases of decision-making. There's an outstanding theoretical discussion at the essay, and that alone is worth taking a few minutes. From the U.S. perspective, the main problem was an essentially irreversible enemy image of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, an image that over time became resistant to new stimuli that might have provided better information on Iraqi intentions and capabilities. But perhaps even more interesting is Saddam's own failures of misperception, and how these virtually guaranteed a U.S. military response. Here's this from the study:

As deputy head of the UNSCOM inspections from 1993 to 2000, and again as the chief investigator into Saddam’s WMD programs after the 2003 invasion Duelfer had a unique opportunity to develop an understanding of how the Iraqis viewed UN weapons inspections and resolutions. During one of the first inspections, while Iraq was still surrounded by the massive forces used to expel it from Kuwait, UNSCOM staff was blocked and various materials were secreted away. This blatant obstruction of the UN inspectors was reported to the Security Council and, after debate among its fifteen members, the council dispatched the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, and the head of the UNSCOM inspection team, Rolf Ekeus, to Baghdad to resolve this dispute over access afforded under the UN cease-fire resolution.

This response—the dispatch of two Swedish diplomats—was seen by Saddam as indicating a weakness of will in the Security Council. He had violated the terms of the cease-fire resolution, and the response was neither regime threatening nor even punitive in nature. The weak response communicated a lesson that shaped Saddam’s attitude toward the UN process. The Security Council would not recommence the war to enforce compliance with disarmament requirements, in spite of whatever some members may have said at the time. Saddam came to regard the UN process not as one wherein he would be obligated to comply categorically, but as one of testing and bargaining. He would give up what he had to give up to convince the Security Council to lift its UN sanctions, but no more.

Over time, Saddam and senior Iraqis came to find the broader UN process vexing and confusing. The collective Security Council position as codiªed in its resolutions seemed straightforward: sanctions would remain in place until Iraq satisfied weapons inspectors that all of Iraq’s WMD capabilities had been eliminated and monitoring systems were put in place to detect any attempts to reconstitute them in the future. Very different messages were sent from individual council members, however. During the Bill Clinton administration, public comments by the president and by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that Washington’s policy was containment of Saddam with an eventual goal of regime change. Albright, in a speech at Georgetown University in March 1997, responded to a question on lifting sanctions by not ing not that Saddam could have them lifted if he complied with UN resolutions, but that “a dialogue” would be possible with a “successor regime.”

To the Iraqis, Albright’s statement seemed to contradict Security Council resolutions. Containment depended on a permanent retention of sanctions, but the resolutions contained the provision that if and when Iraq satisfied weapons inspectors, then sanctions would be lifted. Saddam and senior Iraqis therefore questioned whether Washington would ever agree to lift sanctions, even if Iraq could satisfy the inspectors. They put this paradox to senior UNSCOM staff as well as to officials of Security Council member nations such as France, Great Britain, and Russia, and received assorted and contradictory opinions in return ...

The full study is at the link.