Deterring Enemies in a Shaken World

Daniel Byman reviews Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda, by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, at New York Times:

As they relate this new direction [in counter-terrorism after 9/11], Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Shanker put flesh on approaches and operations that in the past were largely in the realm of specialists. The book is sprinkled with small, vivid anecdotes that bring day-to-day counterterrorism work to life. Take the Horse Blanket, a “graduating series of contingencies that each federal agency could take in response to a potential or actual terrorist attack” beginning in 2007.

Much like a playbook, the Horse Blanket (whose intriguing name goes unexplained here) detailed the cost of each option, its level of disruption and its impact on foreign policy. A report of terrorist efforts to cross from Canada might lead to an increase in border security. Should intelligence agencies gather credible reports of the ultimate nightmare, a nuclear weapon being moved to attack an American city, the border would be shut. Policy makers can now ratchet counterterrorism up or down to match the perceived threat.

Technology has made a revolutionary difference. The authors explain how the contents of cellphones belonging to captured terrorists are cloned in seconds, with computers scanning the numbers to match those of other known terrorists. Such information can tie a suspect to an enemy network and its locations, which in turn helps interrogators ask smarter questions and enables them to direct military forces better. More bad guys die or are taken off the streets, and fewer innocents suffer.

Other efforts are aimed at the hearts and minds of those who have not yet taken sides. To discredit Al Qaeda with the Muslim public, officials sought “to create a constant drumbeat of anti-Al Qaeda information that was factual, directly quoted and heavily sourced,” as one White House official described it. So when the Taliban kill a schoolteacher or terrorists blind schoolgirls in an acid attack, the horrors are trumpeted in local and international media, countering Al Qaeda’s narrative that its fearless warriors fight only heavily armed United States soldiers.

Today, the authors write, American counterterrorism policy embraces “the new deterrence.” By imposing costs on terrorists’ reputations, chances for success, material assets — whatever they hold dear — you “alter the behavior and thinking of your adversary.” In contrast to deterrence strategies during the cold war, deterrence today does not involve a state actor, like the Soviet Union, with nuclear-tipped missiles but rather more nebulous networks that include not only fanatic suicide bombers but also more rational financiers, recruiters, arms runners and others who can be dissuaded by the threat of death or arrest. The new deterrence involves “kinetic” instruments, to use the military parlance for killing people, but also innovative information operations that might discredit a cause and scare away providers of funds.

Sounds like a great book.